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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Police appointment power shift 
President Vladimir Putin issued a decree last week transferring the power to 
appoint regional police chiefs from local control to the Kremlin. (AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE, 1120 PDT, 5 Jun 01; via ClariNet) While details of the 
decree are not yet available, the move fits neatly with Putin's overall strategy of 
asserting greater central control over the regions, and may even be presented as 
part of Dmitri Kozak's efforts to reform the judicial system. (See previous issues 
of THE NIS OBSERVED for more on Kozak's reforms.) 
 
Earlier reports suggested that the authority to appoint and dismiss local police 
chiefs rested with the president's super-region representatives, but this new 
decree would appear to contravene that decision. In either event, the purpose 
remains to circumvent the local governors. 
 
New Primakov memoir reinforces old stereotypes 
Former Prime Minister and spy master Yevgeny Primakov is set to publish a new 
memoir, and judging from the preview, he is just as frustrated with his previous 
employer's "Family" as most other disgruntled Kremlin insiders. According to a 
report in the Moscow Times (6 Jun 01; via lexis-nexis) on the previewed 
chapters, Primakov was persuaded to accept the nomination to the prime 
minister's seat by then-President Yel'tsin's chief of staff, Valentin Yumashev, 
protocol head (and keeper of the facsimile presidential seal) Vladimir 
Shevchenko, and daughter Tatiana Dyachenko. It wasn't long, however, before 
the same group, together with current Chief of Staff Aleksandr Voloshin and a 
gaggle of oligarchs (most notably Boris Berezovsky), turned against him and 
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launched a campaign to secure his ouster. Primakov identifies Voloshin as the 
"ideologist behind the attack" on him, which featured "falsifications, forgeries, 
lies, disinformation and the spread of incredible rumors through journalists 
controlled by Berezovsky." 
 
In the memoir, Primakov portrays Yel'tsin in his second term as weak from 
illness, dependent on medications and unable to overcome the pressures from 
his "Family," an image familiar to most observers. Primakov illustrates the 
characterization with an anecdote from notes recorded by then-chief of staff 
General Nikolai Bordyuzha. In a conversation with Yel'tsin, Bordyuzha is 
informed that he will be replaced by Voloshin. Bordyuzha argues that the 
decision is being foisted on the president by certain Family members opposed to 
Primakov, who are angry with Bordyuzha for not joining the anti-Primakov 
campaign. According to Bordyuzha, Yel'tsin responded with "I hadn't expected 
they would acquire such power. I will chase them all out! I reverse my decision." 
Bordyuzha agrees to stay on, but only if the offending advisers are removed. It 
was, of course, Bordyuzha who was dismissed later that day. 
 
As for the current president, Primakov uses an interview with Kremlin adviser 
Gleb Pavlovsky to draw out the comparisons between them. Pavlovsky cites 
Primakov as a "model" for Putin and claims that Primakov's failure was in not 
forging an alliance with the "Family," which certainly reinforces the thought that 
this was precisely Putin's path to power. The full memoir is due out later this 
summer. 
 
Yel'tsin in China 
The unusually low profile post-presidency of Boris Yel'tsin was punctured briefly 
last month by a trip to China and a meeting with Jiang Zemin. After meeting and 
dining with Zemin, however, Yel'tsin retreated to a villa on the Yellow Sea for a 
vacation and, reportedly, traditional Chinese therapy treatments for his various 
ailments. The villa, which was previously used by Mao Zedong, rents for $15,000 
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a night, but Yel'tsin need not worry. The tab for him and his 18-person entourage 
(including at least six doctors) is being picked up by the Chinese foreign ministry. 
(AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 0340 PDT, 28 May 01, and 0250 PDT, 29 May 
01; via ClariNet) 
 
Borodin returns to Geneva, but... 
Despite predictions made here to the contrary, former Kremlin Economic 
Manager Pavel Borodin did indeed return to Geneva to face money-laundering 
charges. He refused, however, to answer any questions put by the Swiss 
investigators, claiming, through his lawyer, that as the Russian prosecutors had 
cleared Borodin of any charges, the Swiss had no authority to pursue the 
complaint. Swiss prosecutors quickly pointed out that a lack of follow-through on 
the part of the Russians did not mean that the Swiss could not investigate a 
crime committed in Switzerland. Borodin has been summoned to appear again 
before Magistrate Daniel Devaud in July as the investigation continues. Borodin's 
attitude toward the whole affair is nonchalant. I've already answered all the 
questions in Russia, he said before the court appearance today, "I've nothing 
more to do here." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 0706 PDT, 11 Jun 01; via 
ClariNet) 
 
Did anyone else notice that the Russian law on money laundering wasn't signed 
until after Borodin was cleared of all charges? 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Richard Miller 
 
Middle East initiatives-another means to thwart perceived US hegemony 
When taken in isolation, Russian initiatives throughout the Middle East of late 
can be seen as further bids for international influence and for the revival of 
Russia's de facto "great power" status. However, when viewed in the aggregate, 
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they portray a Russian maneuver designed to counter US positions and influence 
in the region.  
 
ISRAEL/PALESTINE AUTHORITY 
Last year, it was President Clinton who tried to cast himself in the role as the 
Middle East peace broker. This year, President Putin seems to be vying for the 
role. Taking advantage of the change in US administrations and an apparently 
concomitant lessened US focus as compared with the late Clinton administration 
period, Russia has been stepping up activities designed to garner influence and 
prominence. Just in the last two weeks, Putin has met with Chairman Yassir 
Arafat in Moscow, held phone consultations with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon and spoken with Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. (INTERFAX, 1312 
GMT, 29 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0529, and INTERFAX, 1352 GMT, 29 May 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0529, via World News Connection) Russian foreign ministry 
officials, and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov himself, have been making multiple 
contacts with both sides in the dispute and calling for a new international 
conference to approach "the next phase in regional settlement efforts." 
(INTERFAX, 1335 GMT, 28 May 01; FBIS-NES-2001-0528, via World News 
Connection) In public statements, Russian officials hail the Egyptian-Jordanian 
proposal and the Mitchell Commission findings as constituting the required basis 
for further negotiations. What also becomes evident is the view that Russian 
prominence in the process is paramount. In fact, Foreign Minister Ivanov added, 
the "failure" [of the US] "has not cooled us but has put us in a mood for active 
work." (INTERFAX, 1337 GMT, 28 May 01; FBIS-NES-2001-0528, and 
INTERFAX, 1335 GMT, 28 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0529, via World News 
Connection)  
 
The emerging Russian position favors the Palestinian view of the dispute. Putin 
told Arafat, "you know how we cherish the traditional friendly relations with the 
Palestinian people. We share the grief of the tragedy lived by the Palestinian 
people." (INTERFAX, 1352 GMT, 29 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0529, via World 
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News Connection) Meanwhile, Vasily Sredin, Putin's special Middle East envoy, 
said both sides should do what is possible to stop the violence but he stressed 
Israel should withdraw its troops, stop the military and economic blockade of the 
Palestinian Authority, and freeze settlement activity. (INTERFAX, 0615 GMT, 29 
May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0529, via World News Connection) The Palestinians 
are responding to Russian leadership; a member of their negotiating team with 
Israel, Saib Erikat, "views Russia as an important mediator whom we constantly 
urge to take initiative and action. Russia should do everything possible to save 
the peace process. This is Russia's natural role." (INTERFAX, 0821 GMT, 29 
May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0529, via World News Connection) The Palestinian 
ambassador to Russia, Khairi al-Oridi, stressed that his side "pins [its] hopes on 
Russia." (ITAR-TASS, 1601 GMT, 26 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0526, via World 
News Connection) 
 
And the dispatch of the head of the Fatherland-All Russia (OVR) faction in the 
Duma, Yevgeny Primakov, to tour Arab countries signals yet again the 
concentration of efforts in the Middle East. Primakov has long been considered a 
leading Soviet/Russian specialist on the region and was instrumental as foreign 
intelligence chief, foreign minister and prime minister during the 1990s in staking 
out Moscow's leadership position towards the Middle East. Usually, the Russian 
position under Primakov was in opposition, or at least in contrast, to the United 
States. Primakov has not delayed in placing the blame for the current situation on 
Israel. While touring in Jordan, he told the Jordanian Al-Dustur newspaper that 
the Israeli policy of replying to Palestinians with "disproportionate acts of violence 
is groundless, while murders of civilians will not put an end to intifada." (ITAR-
TASS, 1221 GMT, 27 May 01; FBIS-NES-2001-0527, via World News 
Connection) 
 
SYRIA 
Primakov again was active on this front, meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-
Asad and delivering Putin's message of satisfaction with the recent multifaceted 
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cooperation between the two countries and the hope that this would rise to new 
levels. (ITAR-TASS, 1609 GMT, 30 May 01; FBIS-NES-2001-0531, via World 
News Connection) Part of these new levels obviously consists of arms transfers. 
During the week of 21 May, Syrian Defense Minister Marshal Mustafa Tlas met 
with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov and Defense Minister Sergei 
Ivanov in Moscow. Their talks revolved around military-technical cooperation, 
which both sides have an interest in reviving. Moscow can expect to earn more 
than $1 billion as a result of implementing delivery of upgrades and new military 
hardware. (KOMMERSANT, 25 May 01; via British Broadcasting Corporation) 
(See Armed Forces section for further specifics of proposed military equipment 
transfers.) Russia needs to resume its previously large-scale military-technical 
cooperation with Syria to help bolster its flagging defense industries by 
generating revenue since Damascus is promising to pay in hard currency. 
(KOMMERSANT, 17 Apr 01; via British Broadcasting Corporation) (However, 
Syria still owes Russia up to $10 billion for previous arms transfers.) 
 
These proposed arms transfers follow a mid-April Israeli Air Force strike against 
a Syrian radar station in Lebanon. At that time, Russian commentary postulated 
the Israeli strike would not have taken place unless Ariel Sharon sensed US 
support and that Washington might exploit any Syrian-Israeli confrontation as an 
opportunity to reassume the main role intermediary in the region and pursue its 
plan for a settlement. (KOMMERSANT, 17 Apr 01; via British Broadcasting 
Corporation) The recent talks can be viewed from the Russian perspective as a 
natural result of events during the past months and another chance to stem 
potential US involvement in the region. 
 
IRAN 
Russia continues to warm relations with Iran on all fronts. Moscow sees Iran as a 
key ally in helping to establish more Russian control over Caspian energy 
reserves (and an alternate transport route to the one put forward by the United 
States and US-backed consortia) and in the Russian struggle against 
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fundamentalist Islamic movements along their southern frontiers. While logic 
would see the Islamic regime in Tehran as part of that problem, Russian leaders 
view broader cooperation as a way of co-opting Iranian opinions and lessening 
anti-Russian sentiment on the part of extreme factions in Iran. The recent arms 
transfer discussions, nuclear energy cooperation, central banking agreements, 
economic proposals, press center cooperation and a host of other initiatives all 
help to hold Iran close to the Russian fold. In late April, Primakov was in Tehran 
stressing that Russian-Iranian relations should expand in "disregard of 
Washington's resentment." (IRNA, 1738 GMT, 29 Apr 01; FBIS-NES-2001-0429, 
via World News Connection)  
 
IRAQ 
After the years of bluster about easing and lifting sanctions against Iraq, Russia 
is now dragging its feet on supporting a British/US-backed measure for smart 
sanctions. The new proposal would lift export restrictions on all forms of 
humanitarian goods to Iraq while hoping to tighten the embargo against arms and 
dual-use products for weapons development, and at the same time extend the 
oil-for-food program. The UN-monitored account would ensure that proceeds 
from Iraqi oil sales would finance food and humanitarian aid for the Iraqi people 
rather than weapons purchases. This account has long maintained funds that the 
Iraqi government has chosen not to spend for its people. Russia's deputy UN 
ambassador, Gennady Gatilov, stressed that Moscow wanted "serious 
discussion" on the proposal and "analyzing the proposed draft resolution in a 
short period does not deem [that] possible." (ITAR-TASS, 0655 GMT, 29 May 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0529, via World News Connection) Primakov went further in 
slamming the US proposal, stating "Russia views those so called smart sanctions 
as a continuation of the embargo, and they will further exacerbate the situation in 
the region... US policy in the region has reached a dead end." (JORDAN TIMES, 
29 May 01; FBIS-NES-2001-0529, via World News Connection) Russia's 
motivation in this is clear -- it wants the embargo lifted completely so that it can 
re-invigorate the arms trade with Iraq. 
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In each of these four areas, Russia is pursuing activities that seem more than 
coincidentally aimed at thwarting US influence in the region. Promoting a huge 
new package of arms transfers to Syria while attempting to pose as the broker of 
peace in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict would seem to be mutually contradictory 
and likely to raise Israeli suspicions. Vigorously pursuing increased cooperation 
with Iran, including arms and the field of nuclear energy, while preparing for an 
upcoming Putin-Bush summit meeting where missile defense is sure to be a 
topic, also seems to pose a contradiction. Stalling on a UN resolution aimed at 
truly aiding the Iraqi people after years of calling for an end to sanctions is 
similarly contradictory. The only common thread that explains these 
contradictions is an attempt to supplant the United States and to assume the 
status of the "power to be" in the Middle East. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
SPS emerges as a party 
Following the dissolution of the nine factions that had founded the Union of Right 
Forces (SPS), a marathon 22-hour-long constituent congress was held on 26-27 
May during which SPS officially became a party. The delegates elected a 32-
person political council (with Anatoly Chubais, Sergei Kirienko, Yegor Gaidar, 
Irina Khakamada, and Boris Nemtsov as co-chairpersons), and named Boris 
Nemtsov party leader by a vote of 237 out of 403. Nemtsov had been the favored 
candidate, but may have been aided by rival Yegor Gaidar's withdrawal from the 
race after the two compromised on party structure. (Nemtsov had been leaning 
toward a stricter framework while Gaidar advocated a looser approach.) 
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The SPS members also adopted a program consisting of the party's "Russian 
liberal manifesto," the SPS political declaration (setting the protection of 
democracy and of the free market as the primary goal), a statement on the 
party's attitude toward presidential and governmental policy ("it is unacceptable 
to proclaim one's loyalty to the president and the government irrespective of what 
they do") and an elaboration of the basic principles of the party's foreign policy 
concept (deploring "the absence of a single and balanced state foreign policy that 
would effectively protect the national interests of Russia" and voicing concern 
that Russia not "find itself on the sidelines of the process of globalization and fall 
out of the community of leading countries"). (NTV, 0748 Moscow time, 27 May 
01; via www.ntv.ru, and ITAR-TASS, 1634 GMT, 26 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0526, via World News Connection) 
 
In a greeting which was read out on 26 May, President Putin expressed the hope 
that the new party consistently would support "democratic reforms and contribute 
to the construction of the rule of law in Russia [and to] solving the tasks facing 
the country." (RIA, 0654 GMT, 26 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0526, via World 
News Connection) 
 
The press reaction has not been entirely optimistic. While some have praised 
SPS for overcoming differences of opinion, there are doubts about the party's 
popularity (according to recent polls, it is in fourth place behind Unity, the 
Communists, and YABLOKO) and about its ability to gather support. The 
government news agency suggests that SPS appeals mainly to "big capital," 
which does not need a political party to represent its interests, and to the 
"intelligentsia" or "professionals," who comprise a very small segment of the 
Russian population. (STRANA.RU, 28 May 01) Still, media speculation about 
Nemtsov's chances in the 2008 presidential elections gives credibility to the 
party. 
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At the time of the congress, fellow democratic YABLOKO representatives 
expressed an interest in cooperating with SPS (another recent merger consisted 
of the declaration of coalition signed by YABLOKO and Democratic Russia). 
However, on 9 June, Grigory Yavlinsky, one of the founders of YABLOKO, 
declared that, while his party has a lot in common with the Union of Right Forces, 
the parties disagree on several basic principles including their respective 
attitudes toward the government and toward the war in Chechnya, and that the 
two coalitions will remain separate. (NTV, 1934 Moscow time, 9 Jun 01; via 
www.ntv.ru) 
 
The third major coordinating meeting took place between the government 
favorite, Unity, and Yuri Luzhkov's Fatherland. Earlier there had been rumors that 
the two could dissolve and form a single party; however, the Unity coordinating 
committee announced that it never considered dissolution and that new 
mechanisms of the political coordination between Unity and Fatherland remain to 
be worked out. Apparently, since Unity is a "party" and Fatherland is a 
"movement," Unity leaders had suggested that Fatherland dissolve and join 
Unity, which it categorically refused to do. (NTV, 1532 Moscow time, 1 Jun 01; 
via www.ntv.ru) Some journalists joked that the name of the new party would be 
created by combining "Edinstvo" + "Otechestvo" = "Ediot." 
 
JUDICIARY 
Proposed reforms center on status and rights  
On 29 May, President Putin submitted four bills on judicial reform to the Duma 
that would affect the status and rights of judges, defense lawyers and 
defendants. Putin also expressed the hope to have jury trials established 
throughout Russia within a year. Duma Deputy Anatoly Lukyanov, who chairs the 
Committee on State Construction, commended the professional and thorough 
drafting of the bill, but suggested that the proposals would engender a "heated 
discussion." (ITAR-TASS, 1038 GMT, 29 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0529, via 
World News Connection) 
 11 
 
Debates over the concept of jury trials already have begun. Prosecutor-General 
Vladimir Ustinov declared that the plans for reform are premature in general, and 
that "many civilized countries have dropped trials by jury as outmoded" in 
particular. (ITAR-TASS, 0755 GMT, 22 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0522, via World 
News Connection) He also opposed the death penalty moratorium in effect in 
Russia.  
 
Justice Minister Yuri Chaika claims he is beginning to oppose the moratorium as 
well. "Terrorists who are responsible for killing innocent children and old people 
cannot be called people in the full sense of this word and therefore deserve the 
most severe punishment. The European Community cannot reproach Russia in 
this respect," he told Council of Europe Secretary General Walter Schwimmer. 
(INTERFAX, 0847 GMT, 25 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0525, via World News 
Connection) It is interesting that this comes on the coattails of the Timothy 
McVeigh death sentence controversy, which has received a lot of attention in the 
Russian media. 
 
Chaika recently also called for the simplification of extradition procedures. 
(INTERFAX, 0830 GMT, 26 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0526, via World News 
Connection) 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Import of nuclear waste discussed 
As the time came for the third reading of the bill on importing nuclear waste, the 
controversy over whether this is an economic miracle or a mirage, a scientifically 
ordinary procedure or a future Chernobyl, flared up again. The case of Chernobyl 
has been brought up not only because of the nuclear connection, but also 
because many still remember the way that the disaster was handled: the 
government has cried -- not "wolf," but "saved" -- a few too many times. There is 
also fear that the money -- $20 billion -- will not go where it should, and that, long 
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after the money is spent, Russia still will be paying the price. The bill has yet to 
receive the approval of the Federation Council and President Putin. Sergei 
Mitrokhin, a State Duma deputy and member of YABLOKO, suggested that the 
Federal Council probably will delay the bill for as long as it can. (YABLOKO and 
SPS were the two parties that voted solidly against the bill, which passed 243 to 
125, with 7 abstentions.) (NTV, 7 Jun 01; via www.ntv.ru) 
 
REGIONS 
How is Siberia like Texas? 
The death penalty is not the only headline topic common to Russia and to 
America. A number of Siberian towns have experienced heavy flooding. Statistics 
run at 17 rayons and 70 population centers affected; 42,000 persons left 
homeless, at least 5 dead and 2 missing; and 7.5 billion rubles needed for 
restoration.  
 
Unfortunately, there is a significant shortfall in the ability to handle the situation. 
At the same time, Putin's PR skills seem to be improving: The Russian president 
flew to the Yakutian town of Lensk, which has suffered the most from floods, and 
made a point of landing on Lensk's central square and walking over to the town 
administration office to chair a meeting of the commission created to deal with 
the aftermath of the disaster (being approached en route by persons asking for 
help).  
 
Furthermore, Putin declared that the country was ready to sell a portion of its 
gold and diamond reserves to fund the restoration of the ruined town of Lensk 
and other settlements in Yakutia. (RIA, 0255 GMT, 24 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0524, via World News Connection) 
 
MEDIA 
The magic circle 
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Media-MOST Capital Management is suing NTV television. The Moscow 
committee for municipal loans and share market development (Moskomzaim) is 
suing Media-MOST. Russian Media Minister Mikhail Lesin is suing former Media-
MOST deputy chairman Igor Malashenko and NTV. Former NTV Director-
General Yevgeny Kisilev is suing NTV and Boris Jordan, the new director of 
NTV. LUKoil-Grant is suing TV6. Meanwhile, Justice Minister Chaika says that 
"nowhere is it possible to state one's viewpoint more freely than in Russia." 
(ITAR-TASS, 1100 GMT, 25 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0525, via World News 
Connection) 
 
In better news, however, the bill to limit foreign ownership in all Russian media 
has been partially de-clawed, with all provisions removed except those 
concerning national television broadcasts, which would apply only to NTV, TV-6, 
TNT, ORT and RTR. (THE RUSSIA JOURNAL, 10 Jun 01; via Johnson's Russia 
List) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Richard Miller 
 
 
Arms and other transfer agreements support Russian foreign policy 
As highlighted in the Foreign Relations section above, Russia has been 
expanding contacts and initiatives throughout the Middle East, countering US 
influence and interests. Outlined below are some of the specific military systems 
discussed or rumored in the region.  
 
SYRIA 
The Syrian military is 90% equipped with Soviet-source hardware, of which 
almost 80% requires modernization. In his recent talks with Russian officials, 
Syrian Defense Minister Tlas indicated Damascus is interested in both 
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modernization of older systems through upgrades and the purchase of new 
equipment. In the upgrade category, Syria would like to include: S-200E surface-
to-air missile systems, T-55 and T-72 tanks, BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, 
MiG-25 interceptors, and MiG-29 fighters. In the new purchase category, Syria 
listed 8 Iskander-E operational-tactical missile systems, 30 Su-30 fighters, the S-
300PMU-1, Buk-M1, and Tor-M1 surface-to-air missile systems, the Mi-35 and 
Ka-52 combat helicopters, and the Project 12418 and 12421 Molniya combatant 
craft as possible acquisitions. Additionally, Syria expressed interest in training up 
to 100 military personnel a year at Russian military academies and schools. In 
discussing last year's Russian launch of an Israeli spy satellite, EROS-A1, from 
the Svobodny space center, with possible further launches for Israel, Moscow 
responded by proposing that 3-5 of the 30 MiG-25s due to be upgraded could be 
reconfigured as the MiG-25RE export-version high-altitude intelligence-gathering 
aircraft, which would allow Damascus to carry out airborne reconnaissance of 
Israeli territory with impunity. Marshal Tlas readily agreed. (KOMMERSANT, 25 
May 01; British Broadcasting Corporation) 
 
IRAN 
The Russian deputy minister for atomic energy, Yevgeny Reshetnikov, 
announced ongoing negotiations for the sale of at least five more nuclear power 
plants to Iran in addition to the long-coming facility at Bushehr. Various sites are 
being studied near Bushehr, Karun, and northern areas around the Caspian 
coast as possible locations for the new plants. Reshetnikov claimed that Russia 
would not violate any international agreements in the transfer of this nuclear 
technology to Iran. (ITAR-TASS, 1602 GMT, 11 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0512 
via World News Connection) These potential reactor sales, and the completion of 
the Bushehr facility with Russian assistance, constitute serious proliferation risks. 
Reactor-grade uranium and plutonium can be processed for weapons use. Once 
the reactors are operational, Iran could reject the IAEA safeguards and begin the 
uranium enrichment process. The increased concern due to Moscow's 
involvement is warranted given Russia's past history of almost openly 
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transferring a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility and atomic energy 
agency's reluctance to insist on Iran's return of spent-fuel plutonium from the 
Bushehr facility. Ultimately, both of these situations were mitigated but only 
through US insistence and arm-twisting of President Yel'tsin by the United 
States. It is doubtful whether American ability to exert this influence in the name 
of non-proliferation will work with President Putin.  
 
The Iranian ambassador in Moscow headed a delegation from the Iranian 
Telecommunications Company to negotiate with Russia's aerospace agency 
officials for a contract to develop, manufacture, and launch a communications 
satellite for Iran. The Reshetnev Applied Mechanics Research and Manufacturing 
Association (NPO PM), based in the closed town of Zheleznogorsk, Krasnoyarsk 
territory, is expected to bid on the contract. (INTERFAX, 1138 GMT, 30 May 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0531, via World News Connection) The Zohreh (Venus) satellite 
is the first of an anticipated constellation of six that will be able to handle radio, 
telephone, and television signals. (IRNA, 0706 GMT, 19 May 01; FBIS-NES-
2001-0519, via World News Connection)  
 
The advance of Iran's satellite communications capability will enable its military 
forces to increase their command and control capability. This is particularly 
pertinent for the expanding Iranian naval capabilities since it could provide 
secure and reliable long-range communication for their KILO-class submarines 
working in concert with other vessels and shore installations to exercise control 
over vital areas such as the Straits of Hormuz. And while no specific mention of 
sale to Iran has been made yet, Russia's Vympel Shipbuilding Company in 
Rybinsk has begun the series manufacture of the Mirazh high-speed hydrofoil. 
This craft is being marketed specifically to Middle-Eastern and Asian-Pacific 
countries. Achieving speeds of up to 50 knots, this aluminum-magnesium alloy 
vessel designed for use in warm/tropical climates can be armed with six Ataka 
missiles and the Shturm fire control system. It also carries Igla antiaircraft 
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missiles and an automated multifunction gunnery system. (ITAR-TASS, 0714 
GMT, 22 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0522, via World News Connection)  
 
Iran is interested in adding Tor-M1 short-range antiaircraft missile systems to its 
air defense network. Russia is discussing including this with the various 
armaments, spare parts, and technical assistance packages discussed earlier 
this year. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 17 Jan 01, for further discussion of 
Russian-Iranian arms transfers.) (ITAR-TASS, 0751 GMT, 28 May 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0528, via World News Connection) 
 
IRAQ 
While Russia has been anxious to see the lifting of sanctions to revive its arms 
trade in the open, it is becoming more and more apparent that illegal transfers 
and assistance are still underway. Speaking at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey on 4 
June, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said American and British pilots 
who fly patrols over Iraq are under increasingly dangerous fire because of 
improved Iraqi defenses. He blamed China and other countries, which he said 
had supplied the Iraqis with advanced antiaircraft technology. (THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, 5 Jun 01) While it was known that Chinese technicians were installing 
fiber-optic networks for the air-defense command and control, the "other 
countries" reference points a finger at Russia since the Iraqi air-defense network 
is largely of Soviet design and systems (limited French systems as well). 
 
Russia's ongoing and proposed military transfers to the Middle East support its 
current foreign policy initiatives of expanding Russian influence, creating ties to 
bolster its perceived "great power" status, and further challenge the military force 
of the US and her allies operating in the region. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
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UKRAINE 
Westward-oriented? 
In recent days, President Leonid Kuchma and Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh 
have gone to great lengths to portray their country as leaning to the west. A 
series of regional meetings -- the most important, of course, being the GUUAM 
summit -- has allowed the two to reacquaint Ukraine with Western 
representatives, and Western representatives with Ukraine. Kuchma once again 
has been able to sell his country as a European oil transit alternative and also to 
suggest gingerly that the Europe Union include Ukraine in its future plans. "A sort 
of barrier, if not an iron curtain, practically exists at the border today," he told 
reporters on 4 June. "If you asked me one month ago, I would have said that 
there were no concrete measures [to develop relations with Ukraine] on the part 
of the leadership of the European Union... I have recently started to have 
optimistic hopes." (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 5 Jun 01; via ISI Emerging Markets)  
 
Those hopes came as the result of meetings with Polish President Alexander 
Kwasniewski, a high-profile visit by US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and 
word that Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson, whose country holds the EU 
presidency, will visit on 19 June. Consequently, Kuchma and Kinakh each have 
been putting their best Western foot forward. Kinakh, who is not known for his 
disagreements with Russian business leaders or officials, has been especially 
vocal. It is essential, he said at the end of May, that Ukraine diversifies its energy 
supply. "Now," he noted, "Ukraine's energy security hugely depends on Russian 
supplies. This is alarming, because a situation like this quite often is exploited for 
political purposes." (INTERFAX, 1715 GMT, 29 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0529, 
via World News Connection) 
 
But despite this rhetoric, has anything really changed since one month ago, as 
Kuchma suggested? 
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To be sure, the fact that GUUAM finally managed to agree on an organizational 
charter, especially given the precarious domestic situations within all of the 
member countries, should be vigorously welcomed. Yet, the group failed to sign 
an agreement to create a free trade zone. But, really, did anyone ever expect 
Moldova and Uzbekistan to betray Russia and agree to this? The charter -- and 
the members' recommitment to the transport corridor -- are accomplishment 
enough for one summit. Simply put, the prospect that these countries may 
actually create an alternative pipeline route to Russia -- and that China and 
Pakistan may be interested in participating -- is an unlikely thought. Of course, 
much work remains, especially given the large gaps still plaguing the Silk Road 
corridor, the unfinished construction on the Odessa-Brody-Gdansk pipeline, and 
the lack of significant investment in the project. Nevertheless, the summit should 
bolster the hopes of liberals within Ukraine who worried that the Gongadze 
scandal would usher in an era characterized by the Little Russian syndrome. 
 
Yet, there was something hollow about Kuchma's wholehearted support for 
Western-oriented policies during the summit. Something was just a little off. 
 
Could it be that his words came shortly after he announced that he would name a 
batch of hand-picked "state secretaries" answerable only to him to oversee the 
work of the cabinet? Or that the Constitutional Court, which is expected to rule on 
the constitutionality of this move, reportedly already is being pressured by 
Kuchma's "friends?" Perhaps it is because Kuchma continues to attempt to fulfill 
an agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin (made seemingly in 
exchange for Putin's support during the Gongadze affair) to join their countries' 
electric power grids? Or perhaps it is because the judge who released Yulia 
Tymoshenko from jail and effectively ruled that Georgiy Gongadze was dead is 
being investigated vigorously for negligence? Certainly Judge Mykola 
Zamkovenko's words don't portray a high level of democratic orientation. "If they 
keep pressuring me like this," he said, "I will have to appeal to Radio Liberty and 
seek political asylum for my family, for my children and wife. I am not afraid for 
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myself." (UKRAYINA MOLODA, 29 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0529, via World 
News Connection) 
 
Yes, something was just a little off in Yalta. And it still is. Kuchma may have 
returned to a Western-oriented foreign policy, but domestically, the president's 
methods continue to resemble more closely good old-fashioned Eastern 
authoritarianism. 
 
The pope is coming! The pope is coming! 
As the pope's visit to Ukraine nears, Russian Orthodox Patriarch Aleksei II 
continues to sound the alarm. The visit, he exclaimed, will "complicate" relations 
between the Orthodox and Catholics because "the Greek-Catholic war continues 
against Orthodox believers in Ukraine." (ITAR-TASS, 1106 GMT, 3 Jun 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0604, via World News Connection) As a result, "The wounds are still 
bleeding that were inflicted at the beginning of the 1990s when Greek Catholics 
violently seized Orthodox churches." And those wounds were not helped when 
"recently Greek Catholics attempted to destroy an Orthodox church in Lviv to 
clear the way for the Pope's procession," he dubiously claimed. (THE 
INDEPENDENT, 8 Jun 01; via Johnson's Russia List) Finally, he said, he is 
waiting to see whether the pope's expression of repentance for wrongs done to 
Orthodox believers is genuine. "It has only been declared so far," he noted, "and 
we shall see how his words about forgiveness will materialize in reality." 
 
Curiously, Aleksei made no mention of his plans to ask for forgiveness for the 
decades that he supported the suppression of Catholics in the Soviet Union. Or 
for his refusal to recognize an independent Ukrainian Orthodox church. Perhaps 
he was too busy trying to figure out how to hold on to "believers" in Ukraine. 
Judging from a number of polls taken in the 1990s, the majority of Ukrainians 
have deserted the Moscow patriarch. For example, in 1993, 48% of those polled 
in Ukraine gave allegiance to the Kyiv patriarch, while only 16% supported 
Aleksei. A separate poll in 1994 found a 41% to 23% breakdown. Add to that the 
 20 
15-16% who follow the Greek Catholic faith, and Aleksei does indeed have much 
to worry about. (For poll details, see Andrew Wilson, UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM 
IN THE 1990s, p. 90.) 
 
BELARUS 
Preparing for Armageddon . . . 
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka has begun preparing his people for the 
inevitable -- the Western invasion. Yes, it's true that he has prepared them for 
this event many times in the past, but this time it's for real. And apparently it's 
being spearheaded by the OSCE.  
 
On Victory Day, Lukashenka explained his unique theory of war. "The first war 
was the Great Patriotic War, the second was the Chernobyl disaster, and the 
third was the collapse of the USSR," he said. "Now attempts are being made to 
foist a fourth war on us, a war similar to the one in Yugoslavia. Vast sums of 
money are being spent on this, and all-out efforts are being made to bring 
unprecedented outside pressure to bear." (OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, 17-23 May 
01; Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, via lexis-nexis) 
 
Now Lukashenka has found the main source of this "outside pressure" and "vast 
sums of money." On 17 May, Foreign Minister Mikhail Khvostov railed against 
Hans-Georg Wiek, the OSCE chief of mission for Belarus. Wiek has been 
informed, Khvostov said, "that we will no longer tolerate OSCE activities aimed at 
destabilizing the country, and that if these continue we will examine the question 
of his expulsion." Furthermore, the foreign minister complained that the OSCE 
had been transformed "into an instrument of control over Eastern European 
countries." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 18 May 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Clearly, the OSCE's intention to provide election observers for the upcoming 
presidential election is seen as disturbing to President Lukashenka and his 
disciples, especially since the opposition so far has managed to craft an effective 
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campaign. The five men interested in battling Lukashenka for his position have 
formed a coalition campaign designed to confuse the authorities as to which one 
will actually run in the end. So far, it has been effective. Vladimir Goncharik, who 
is the chairman of the Belarusian Federation of Trade Unions, former Grodno 
Province Governor Semyon Domash, former Defense Minister Pavel Kozlovsky, 
former Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir and Communist Party leader Sergei 
Kalyakin are all managing to go about collecting the necessary signatures to 
contest the election. Perhaps the best evidence that they are having some level 
of success is the need for Lukashenka to create fears of attacks on the state and 
inappropriate activity by the OSCE. Removing the activist OSCE head from the 
area would certainly help his cause. The president obviously does not feel that 
his hold on power is totally secure. Only the future will tell, however, if his grip 
can truly be undone. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
Publish the pictures 
In testimony to Congress last week, a senior state department official, acting 
special advisor for the NIS John Beyrle, spoke of Russia's "culture of impunity" 
with regard to human rights violations and "crimes" against Chechens. 
(JOHNSON'S RUSSIA LIST, 5 Jun 01) Beyrle called on other states and 
international agencies to put pressure on Russia. However, there is more the US 
government can do to promote pressure on perpetrators. 
 
When Chechen Foreign Minister Ilyas Akhmadov met with Beyrle in March, he 
asked the US government to make public satellite photography of evidence of 
Russian atrocities in Chechnya, including mass graves and detention camps. 
Frequent harassment and intimidation, and in some cases violence, against 
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journalists and human rights workers have limited the flow of information from the 
republic. In the past, the US has used its satellite photography to expose 
atrocities committed in Serbia and Iraq but has hesitated to apply the same 
standard to Russia. 
 
Spring: Birds sing. Flowers bloom. Russian commanders panic. 
By now most politicians and analysts agree that the Russian occupation of the 
Chechen republic has been a failure. Unable to break the Chechen resistance, 
federal forces have only embittered the Chechen civilians. Not even the 
demagogues of the war dare to forecast any successes. The main question 
remaining is best expressed by paraphrasing T.S. Eliot: How will it end? With a 
bang or with a whimper?  
 
If the patterns of the last war are any indication, the Russian side will not 
undertake talks until the Chechens have made a very loud "bang." In the past it 
took the form of Shamil Basaev's July 1995 operation in Budennovsk or Aslan 
Maskhadov's liberation of Grozny in August 1996. However, despite widespread 
rumors and expectations of large-scale counteroffensives last summer and this 
spring, such operations have not materialized. Instead, the Russian forces seem 
to be dissolving from the cumulative damage of numerous guerrilla attacks and a 
heightened sense of their own futility. 
 
On 31 May, FSB Deputy Director Rear Admiral German Ugryumov died of a 
heart attack in Khankala. Since January he had been in charge of all operations 
in Chechnya. On 4 June Gennady Troshev, the commander of the North 
Caucasus Military district, called for public hangings. Troshev is temporarily in 
charge of military operations in Chechnya since his predecessor, General Valery 
Baranov, was relieved in May. On 7 June Glasnost - North Caucasus reported 
that 20 senior officers serving in Chechnya have been dismissed in the last 
month. It's safe to say that the leadership of the Russian forces is feeling the 
strain.  
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Confirming that the occupation has accomplished very little, a Duma deputy from 
the YABLOKO faction, Aleksei Arbatov, summed up his impression from a trip to 
Chechnya: "Supposedly, militants, drugs and ammunition are coming into 
Chechnya through the mountainous regions. But that is not the case. Strange as 
it may seem, the situation is the other way around. Right now, in the mountains 
things are under control to a much greater extent than in the plains regions. (...) 
We were flying on that ill-fated helicopter in the mountainous regions, in the 
Argun ravine (...) and everything went well." (VREMYA MN, 5 Jun 01) The Argun 
ravine borders Georgia and has been denounced repeatedly as a source of 
militancy. Arbatov's helicopter in fact was shot down over Ingushetia. President 
Aslan Maskhadov's forces have taken responsibility for this action, adding that 
they would not have shot the plane if they had known a Duma deputy was on 
board. 
 
Counting the losses 
On 16 May, presidential spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky gave the figure of 
3,096 total losses in the present conflict. Two weeks later the defense minister, 
Sergei Ivanov, came up with a lower number. According to Ivanov, the Ministry of 
Defense had lost 2,026 men and the total for the combined group of forces 
(including security services) comes to 2,682. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 28 
MAY 01; via Johnson's Russia List) According to a General Staff report, obtained 
by Argumenty i Fakty, the number of losses for Russian servicemen is 3,108. (30 
May 01)  
 
That those numbers vastly understate the true losses can be judged from a 
document cited by the grani.ru news service on 30 May. In a 22 May letter to the 
Duma, Vladimir Zolotarev, the chairman of the presidential commission for 
prisoners of war internees and missing in action, states that defense ministry 
laboratories have identified 2,369 bodies of Russian servicemen who had died in 
the North Caucasus from 1 August 1999 to the present. Only bodies that cannot 
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be identified without the help of forensic specialists are sent to the lab. This 
number of corpses must be fewer than the number whose identity can be 
ascertained more readily. If the ratio is estimated very conservatively at 1 to 1, 
this yields nearly 5,000. Last spring, the Soldiers' Mothers Committee counted 
4,500 fatalities combined for the military, MVD and security services, and 
estimated that the actual number could be as high as 7,000.  
 
Troop withdrawal halted 
In May the military halted the previously announced withdrawal of combat units 
from Chechnya, notes the authoritative defense journalist Pavel Felgenhauer. In 
February it was announced that Ministry of Defense troop levels would be 
decreased to 23,000 in addition to the 20,000 FSB and MVD troops. In May the 
withdrawal was halted at an estimated combined force of 75,000. (MOSCOW 
TIMES, 24 May 01) On 4 June the MVD announced that soon 1,500 troops 
would be added to the 46th brigade stationed in Chechnya, which at present 
numbers 6,000. (POLIT.RU) 
 
This news came just as some officials began to call publicly for a withdrawal of 
forces. Stanislav Ilyasov, the prime minister of the Russian-installed Chechen 
government, described a conversation with Chief of Staff Anatoly Kvashnin in 
which Ilyasov advised Kvashnin to "withdraw gradually." "The war is over. I had a 
serious conversation with Kvashnin. I told him 'Come on now, move out.'" 
(REUTERS, 6 Jun 01) However, on 8 June Minister for Chechnya Vladimir Elagin 
stated that a withdrawal of forces will not be discussed in the near future. 
(POLIT.RU) 
 
Chechenization a flop 
Just as the military occupation has failed, so too have attempts to shift 
responsibility to Chechen civilian authorities. On one hand, these officials lack 
legitimacy because they are propped up a brutal occupying army. On the other 
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hand, if they do establish any public confidence they become unreliable for the 
federals.  
 
In addition to Ilyasov's comments cited above, several other incidents illustrate 
this tension. On 4 June, Aslanbek Aslakhanov, himself a retired MVD general 
and now the Duma deputy from Chechnya, threatened to resign if "cleansings" 
and disappearances don't cease. (POLIT.RU) On 6 June Ilyasov announced 
Gen. Troshev's agreement to coordinate military operations with the Chechen 
government, just as the military closed roads to Grozny preventing the Chechen 
government from holding a meeting there. (GAZETA.RU, 6 Jun 01) Akhmad 
Kadyrov commented on the resignations of three local officials and the 
assassinations of three other administrators and five policemen. Kadyrov, the 
head of the Russian-installed administration, said: "I will not be surprised if all the 
heads of local administrations hand in their resignations tomorrow," since neither 
the federal forces nor the local police can protect them from attacks by the 
Chechen resistance. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 8 Jun 01) 
 
Give apartheid a chance! 
According to a Russian newspaper, when he was MVD minister, current Security 
Council Secretary Vladimir Rushailo issued Order 151 "On Abolition of conditions 
for organization of terrorist acts in Russia." The order was intended "to set up 
strict conditions for the life and activities of ethnic Chechens in the Russian 
Federation,... to restrict and if possible ban residency of ethnic Chechens in 
Moscow and other Russian cities,... restrict departure of ethnic Chechens from 
their permanent residence and the issuing of visas and foreign passports, ... to 
audit companies involving ethnic Chechens and other residents of Chechnya and 
freeze their bank accounts, with the purpose of preventing financial aid to 
guerrillas,... [and] to detain ethnic Chechens and bring them to local internal 
affairs directorates for identification...." (VREMYA MN, 15 May 01; via lexis-nexis)  
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This directive, which Rushailo now denies issuing, was made public by Beslan 
Gantamirov. A convicted criminal who was freed from jail to assist the federal 
forces in their operations against Grozny in 1999, Gantamirov was later 
appointed deputy to Kadyrov and then named mayor of Grozny. He resigned this 
position on 17 May , only two days after the decree's publication. On 1 June, 
lenta.ru reported that General Viktor Kazantsev will soon appoint Gantamirov as 
chief federal inspector in Chechnya.  
 
Gantamirov's quarrel with the MVD and his recent appointment by Kazantsev are 
manifestations of a continuing power struggle among the power ministries. On 3 
May, he accused Russian troops of beating and killing Chechen civilians during a 
May Day "cleansing" in the marketplace of the Chechen capital, which led to 
clashes among men from the MVD, the army and the Chechen militia. "Three 
people who had no link whatsoever with (Chechen separatist) rebels were killed 
and a dozen others injured by mortar shells fired by a unit" of the Russian interior 
ministry forces, Gantamirov told television station NTV. (AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, 3 May 01; via lexis-nexis) Killings of ethnic Russians in Grozny served 
as the pretext for the MVD's May Day cleansings. Gantamirov ordered his militia 
to find those responsible and execute them on the spot. (INTERFAX, 5 May 01) 
Considering widespread and persistent rumors that those engaged in such 
activities are Russian-sponsored provocateurs, Gantamirov's order may have 
been interpreted as a threat against Russian agents. As he reiterated on 4 June, 
Gantamirov would execute "terrorists" without the "delay" associated with arrest, 
detention, and trial. (VESTI.RU)  
 
Troshev clarifies 
Even if the Rushailo decree is a fake, there is no lack of bad ideas. On 4 June 
Troshev told Izvestia: " I would do it like this: Gather all of them in the town 
square, string up the bandit and let him hang, so that all can see!" Gennady 
Raikov, head of the pro-Kremlin People's Deputy faction of the Duma, and 
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Rostov Governor Vladimir Chub expressed support for Troshev's approach. 
(POLIT.RU, 6 Jun 01) 
 
The president's spokesman, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, quickly commented that 
those must be the general's private views and only those fighters who refuse to 
surrender their weapons can be killed without trial. Troshev clarified on 8 June 
that executions should occur only after a trial. (POLIT.RU) On 9 June Troshev 
offered a new plan: District administrators in Chechnya should mobilize the 
relatives of the fighters to exercise their influence and persuade the fighters to 
surrender their weapons. (LENTA.RU) 
 
Troshev's comments indicate that the federal side has run out of options. These 
remarks also show how far public values have degenerated in just one year. 
Troshev and Gantamirov went substantially beyond what even Col. Budanov 
deemed publicly permissible. In March of 2000, Col. Yuri Budanov took a young 
Chechen woman out of her home, then beat, raped, and murdered her. Later, 
when he was charged with the crime, he explained that he thought she was a 
sniper. However, he did try to conceal her body and hide his guilt. A year ago 
there was something shameful about this sort of behavior. Now, after Budanov 
has become a folk hero, Troshev and Gantamirov can call publicly for extra-
judicial execution. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Lt. Col. James DeTemple and Fabian Adami 
 
CST states sign rapid reaction force agreement 
On 25 May in Yerevan, the presidents of the six CIS Collective Security Treaty 
(CST) states -- Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
-- gave the green light for the creation of a rapid reaction force to fight 
international terrorism on the southern borders of the CIS. 
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In a joint statement, the leaders highlighted the importance of setting up rapid 
reaction forces to form part of "a strong and united resistance to attempts to 
violate the peace and stability of Central Asia." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 25 
May 01; via lexis-nexis) The joint rapid reaction force will be relatively small at 
first, consisting of approximately 2,000 troops. It will be formed from battalions 
from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, and will be used to respond 
to flash points in Central Asia, particularly the unstable Tajik-Afghan border. 
Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik military contingents will be based in their respective 
countries. Russia will reallocate one battalion of its 201st motorized division, 
already stationed in Tajikistan. (IZVESTIA, 26 May 01; via lexis-nexis) The 
battalions eventually will be expanded to brigade-sized quick reaction units. The 
nucleus of this rapidly deployable force will consist initially of airborne units that 
will depend heavily on Russian aviation for mobility. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 
25 May 01; via lexis-nexis) The formation of a "coalition expeditionary corps" will 
enable Russia and the three Central Asian states to react more concretely than 
before to threats arising in the region. (VREMYA NOVOSTI, 28 Apr 01; via the 
Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press)  
 
Kyrgyzstan Defense Minister Esen Topoev said the operational headquarters for 
the rapid reaction force will be based in Bishkek, and that the force should be 
ready by 1 August. The command and control relationships for the nascent force 
presumably were outlined during recent "Southern Shield" exercises in Moscow. 
Russia almost certainly will dominate the key leadership positions and command 
structure. CST defense officials said the force's main task is to repel incursions 
into former Soviet territory by armed Islamic groups allegedly supported by the 
Taliban in Afghanistan, in addition to other crisis management responsibilities. 
(AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 25 May 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
While designed to work in Central Asia, the force will not include troops from 
Turkmenistan, a militarily non-aligned country, and Uzbekistan, the largest 
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regional military power. Indeed, Uzbekistan's military aviation played a significant 
role last summer in halting armed insurgents infiltrating a remote mountainous 
region bordering southern Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan from bases in Tajikistan. 
According to Vladimir Rushailo, Russia's Security Council secretary, "The rapid 
deployment force was created for Central Asia, and this is why there are all 
prerequisites for Uzbekistan to join this organization." (ITAR-TASS, 28 May 01; 
via lexis-nexis) However, Ashgabat and Tashkent withdrew from the collective 
security agreement in 1999 and have accused Moscow of using the threat of 
Islamic insurgency to preserve its military presence in the region. 
 
Central Asian countries face an uphill struggle for reform  
Since winning presidential elections in October last year that were described by 
international observers as a sham, Kyrgyzstan President Askar Akaev has made 
moves and instituted policies that are designed to bolster his image. Speaking to 
The New York Times last month, Akaev stated: "We admit that mistakes were 
made, and we are fully committed to correct them and stay on the track of 
democracy." (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 10 May 01) President Akaev clarified his 
statement, claiming that his top priority is the alleviation of poverty and the 
improvement of his country's human rights record.  
 
On 29 May, Akaev began to attempt to institute some reforms. Speaking at a 
forum in Bishkek, he promised that his country would honor all of its foreign debt 
obligations, and would take out loans only for the "most essential projects." He 
also introduced a program called the "Comprehensive Development Framework," 
which purportedly is designed to fight poverty and root out corruption. However, 
the program encountered some problems. Parliamentary opposition groups, 
Kyrgyzstan and Communists of Kyrgyzstan, claim that the government did not 
allow parliament to consider the CDF documents, and blocked opposition 
participation in the preparation of the plan. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 30 May 01; via 
EurasiaNet, Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest.) 
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On a tour of Central Asia, Germany's foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, stopped 
in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Several members of the Bundestag, as well as 
an economic delegation, accompanied him. Prior to Mr. Fischer's departure, a 
foreign ministry press release stated that talks in Central Asia would focus on 
economic and security issues, in a continuation of President Islam Karimov's 
recent visit to Berlin.  
 
In meetings with senior Uzbek officials, including President Karimov, Prime 
Minister Utkir Sultanov and Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov, dialogue was 
focused largely on security, human rights and economic issues. Speaking after 
the meeting, Fischer elaborated on the issues that had been discussed. He 
stated that he had raised the topic of security, especially the question of drug 
trafficking, since a substantial portion of narcotics that reach Germany comes 
from Central Asia. Mr. Fischer claimed that Tashkent's willingness to cooperate 
on such important problems would influence EC policy positively toward 
Uzbekistan. The economic aspect of the talks, meanwhile, were centered on the 
question of how German investment in the country could be increased. Last year, 
trade exchanges between the two countries amounted to $291 million. 
(EURASIA INSIGHT, 28 May 01; via EurasiaNet, Uzbekistan Daily Digest) 
 
In Kazakhstan, the discussions were of a similar nature, as Fischer met with 
President Nursultan Nazarbaev, Prime Minister Qasymzhomart Toqaev, and 
Economic Minister Zhaksybek Kulekeev. The meetings specified a number of 
issues that will be discussed further, when President Nazarbaev travels to 
Germany in October. The timing of Fischer's meeting with the Kazakh president, 
in which he spoke of the need for Kazakhstan to reform more quickly, fortuitously 
coincided with the rejection of an appeal by the editor of Kazakhstan's opposition 
newspaper against a one-year prison sentence, on charges of "insulting the 
honor and dignity of President Nazarbaev." 
 
Speaking to the press after his summit with Kazakh ministers, Fischer stated:  
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"We discussed the link between democracy and the creation of a state governed 
by the rule of law." Fischer added that during talks with Economic Minister 
Kulekeev, he had spoken of the fact that a developing economy requires greater 
transparency, which is impossible to achieve without a deeper separation of 
powers. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 23 May 01) 
On the subject of trade, Fischer, as he had done in Uzbekistan, noted that 
turnover between the Federal Republic of Germany and Kazakhstan was 
healthy, exceeding $1 billion annually. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Maria Metcalf 
 
May flowers for the Baltic countries 
May brought an increase in the momentum of political support for EU and NATO 
Baltic enlargement, highlighted by two significant meetings at the end of the 
month.  
 
On 27 May, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly opened in Vilnius, Lithuania. The 
delegations from the 19 NATO countries met for five days to discuss the most 
pressing issues of the alliance. Enlargement topped the list. The assembly has 
no formal status within NATO's command structure, but the primary assembly 
attendees are the lawmakers of the member countries who would have to ratify 
the treaty in order to enlarge the alliance. 
 
The meetings provide the aspirant countries with a forum through which they can 
build political support for enlargement. It seems that the Baltic states were 
successful in this endeavor. Although NATO member support for the Baltics has 
been evident throughout the Spring (see THE NIS OBSERVED, 2 May 01), the 
three ex-Soviet countries have been able to consolidate backing; many former 
doubters are becoming supporters. During the assembly, NATO Secretary-
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General Lord George Robertson said in a speech that the alliance is committed 
to accepting new members and the fact that some aspirant countries were former 
Soviet territories would have no bearing on eventual membership invitations.  
 
Russian delegates did not attend the Vilnius session of the NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly. On 23 May, the State Duma carried a resolution to increase 
resistance to NATO's putative eastward expansion. The Duma told the 
permanent delegation not to attend any assembly events in NATO candidate 
countries, because attendance would be tantamount to a tacit agreement that 
NATO expansion is inevitable. A recent poll of Russian foreign policy experts 
indicated that a total of 52.9 percent see NATO enlargement as a threat. But on 
29 May, Lithuanian foreign minister said that the three ex-Soviet Baltic states are 
"sick and tired" of being kept out of NATO because of Russian objections. 
(AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 1443 GMT, 01 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0529 via 
World News Connection) After the assembly, the debate over the inevitability of 
NATO enlargement was put to rest once and for all: Decisions regarding NATO 
enlargement in 2002 will not revolve around Russian resistance. The momentum 
for enlargement is undeniable. 
 
The third joint meeting of the Baltic Assembly (BA) and Nordic Council occurred 
in the Latvian capital Riga from 31 May to 2 June. This meeting demonstrated 
that the Baltic countries and the Nordic countries are intent on common regional 
cooperation. After the meeting, the chairman of the Nordic Council, Svend Erik 
Hovmand, said that the participating countries -- Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden -- will be able to express their 
collective opinion as eight equal partners in the future. The meeting's main issues 
included EU enlargement, regional cooperation, participation of parliaments in 
Europe's Northern Dimension project, and security and defense policies.  
 
The Nordic countries stressed that they "actively back a reasonable, democratic 
and adequate process of inclusion of the Baltic countries in EU which would 
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result in their full-fledged membership." (LETA, 1001 GMT, 1 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0601, via World News Connection) The participants agreed also that the 
current cooperation will continue after the process of EU enlargement is 
complete. Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs Indulis Berzins expressed concern 
lest certain European Union candidate countries be grouped together, because 
such grouping ignores the individual countries' actual readiness to join. (In EU 
discussions thus far, Latvia has been considered to be in the second group for 
consideration -- behind fast-track countries such as Estonia.) The deputy 
chairman of the BA Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, Vytautas 
Landsbergis, stated that the Baltic countries do not want to be considered "a 
special case," and that they should be admitted into the EU because they are 
prepared, not because they are perceived as a buffer zone between Europe and 
Russia. In the same speech, however, Landsbergis warned that the West should 
take care to prevent Kaliningrad from becoming a "black hole" in Europe. (LETA, 
1148 GMT, 1 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0601, via World News Connection)  
 
Also discussed at the meeting was Russia's involvement in the Northern 
Dimension, the EU's initiative for regional cooperation and development in 
northern Europe. Latvian delegate Romualda Razuks said that involvement with 
the Northern Dimension would allow better cooperation with Russia: "In a short 
period the Northern Dimension has become an important instrument for regional 
cooperation that enhances regional stability, the EU enlargement process and 
economic integration of Russia." (LETA, 0855 GMT, 1 Jun 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0601, via World News Connection) The eight countries agreed, however, that the 
Northern Dimension project on regional cooperation should not be seen as an 
alternative to EU or NATO enlargement. 
 
Issues concerning security were pervasive throughout the BA and Nordic Council 
meeting. It was determined that the eight countries will increase dialogue 
concerning defense policies. The conclusion of this meeting was that the 
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enlargement of the EU and NATO is crucial for stability, freedom, peace and 
welfare in Europe.  
 
International warm fuzzies 
The chairman of the US Senate's Foreign Relations European Affairs 
Subcommittee, Gordon Smith, forecast that US President George W. Bush would 
actively support NATO expansion. US leadership is essential to the 
implementation of NATO enlargement. Smith also said that NATO would invite 
the Baltics despite the borders that the two have with Russia, and despite 
Russian opposition. 
 
The president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), 
Lord Russell-Johnston, in a speech to the Estonian parliament on 31 May, 
praised Estonia's contributions to the EC as disproportionate to its size. 
According to the NATO commander-in-chief of Allied Forces North Europe, Gen. 
Sir Jack Deverell, Estonian defense structures are approaching NATO goals as 
well. 
 
Upon his arrival for the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, NATO Secretary-General 
Lord George Robertson commended Lithuania for carrying out its membership 
action plan. Robertson told reporters, "I am happy that defense reform taking 
place here takes Lithuania in the right direction, and not only for the membership 
action plan, but for the defense of Lithuania as a whole." (BNS, 0812 GMT, 31 
May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0531, via World News Connection) However, Lord 
Robertson added that all eight other NATO aspirant countries were doing well 
with their membership action plans, and he would not comment on Lithuania's 
chances for a NATO invitation at the next summit meeting in Prague 2002. 
 
German Bundestag President Wolfgang Thierse gave high marks to Latvia's 
progress in the political and economic sectors and confirmed Germany's support 
for Latvian strides toward EU and NATO membership. Before the recent summit 
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in Brussels, the EU commissioner for enlargement, Guenter Verheugen, told 
Latvian Prime Minister Andris Berzins that Latvia, along with other "second-
group" candidates for EU membership, most likely will be able to catch up with 
the first group of candidates. Norwegian Foreign Affairs Minister Thorboern 
Jagland also expressed support for Latvia joining NATO. 
 
Such statements must be providing some assurance for the Baltic states, as they 
continue to aspire to international alliances. And vocalized support only can help 
to reiterate that the West is keeping its eye on what happens in the region. That 
can provide security in the short term by itself. 
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